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The Curtailment Mortgage: A Proposal to Benefit Homeowners 
Abstract 
The Obama administration’s effort to encourage homeowners to refinance their mortgages under the 
Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) represents a reasonable approach at helping homeowners 
benefit from the current low mortgage rates. The HARP reduces the high costs of refinancing and in some 
cases makes refinancing possible for properties whose values have fallen below the mortgages’ values. 
While this will provide the intended benefit of increasing the homeowners’ income by reducing their 
mortgage payments, a closer inspection of the refinancing process in the US reveals that the current 
treatment of prepayment in US mortgages provides a disincentive for homeowners to accumulate equity 
in their houses. We propose a new mortgage contract, one which augments the terms of the existing 
conventional fixed-rate mortgage, which encourages homeowner equity accumulation thus leading to a 
more stable housing sector that can better weather future house price declines. From an economic policy 
perspective, the ability to reduce long term debt payments will have the same economic effect of 
increasing household’s permanent income which can provide a boost to the economy. This new mortgage 
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The Obama administration’s effort to encourage homeowners to refinance their 
mortgages under the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) represents a 
reasonable approach at helping homeowners benefit from the current low mortgage rates. 
The HARP reduces the high costs of refinancing and in some cases makes refinancing 
possible for properties whose values have fallen below the mortgages’ values. While this 
will provide the intended benefit of increasing the homeowners’ income by reducing their 
mortgage payments, a closer inspection of the refinancing process in the US reveals that 
the current treatment of prepayment in US mortgages provides a disincentive for 
homeowners to accumulate equity in their houses. We propose a new mortgage contract, 
one which augments the terms of the existing conventional fixed-rate mortgage, which 
encourages homeowner equity accumulation thus leading to a more stable housing sector 
that can better weather future house price declines. From an economic policy perspective, 
the ability to reduce long term debt payments will have the same economic effect of 
increasing household’s permanent income which can provide a boost to the economy. 
This new mortgage proposal can be implemented by the government at little to no cost. 
 
 
Curtailment and Current Practice 
 
An undesirable feature of the fixed-rate mortgage contract is the treatment of a partial pay 
down of the mortgage principal, known in the industry as curtailment. Refinancing can be 
viewed as the extreme case of curtailment, for the entire mortgage balance. Under current 
rules, any amount the homeowner pays which is above his scheduled payment is used to 
reduce the outstanding mortgage balance. This reduction is used to re-amortize the 
mortgage by keeping the size of the mortgage payments the same but reducing the loan’s 
maturity, cutting the end off the mortgage, so to speak. The consequence is that such 
curtailment payments will have no effect on the homeowner’s immediate income since 
mortgage payments will remain the same till the new maturity. The homeowner’s only 
benefit from curtailment is the knowledge that the loan will be shortened and that there 
will be a reduction in the total interest paid, benefits that he enjoys only at maturity.  
 
For example, the monthly payment for a 25-year, $150,000, 6% mortgage is $966.45. 
After five years of regular payments, the mortgage balance is reduced to $134,898 
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through amortization. Suppose the homeowner decides to make a curtailment payment of 
$5,000 to increase his equity and reduce his mortgage debt. This payment will be used to 
reduce his mortgage balance to $129,898 and the mortgage maturity will be reduced by 
16 months from 20 remaining years to 18 years and 8 months. However, the mortgage 
payments will remain at $966.45 for the remainder of his new loan term. 
 
We see that the primary benefit from this curtailment example is realized in 18 years and 
8 months. While it’s true that the borrower will save $10,919 of interest charges over the 
remaining life of the loan, this benefit is of little value to any borrower who has more 
immediate and intermediate-term financial concerns. This feature of the fixed-rate 
mortgage provides a strong disincentive for homeowners to prepay their mortgage debt 
with discretionary funds gained either through an unanticipated one time increase in 
income or from wage increases arising from normal earning profiles. Moreover, the idea 
of partially paying off one’s mortgage is made less attractive by the fact that in actuality, 
few mortgages are ever held to maturity.  
 
 
A New Proposal – The Curtailment Mortgage 
 
The disincentive to pay down one’s mortgage with curtailment payments can be easily 
reversed by altering the method that such payments are used to reduce the mortgage 
balance. To end this disincentive, we propose a new mortgage instrument, the 
Curtailment Mortgage, which fundamentally alters the way mortgage payments are 
determined. Instead of keeping the mortgage payment the same and reducing the loan’s 
maturity, a mortgage agreement could easily keep the remaining maturity the same and 
re-amortize the loan, resulting in a reduction in the mortgage payment. We call such a 
mortgage the Curtailment Mortgage (CM). 
 
Using our previous example of a 5-year-old, $134,898, 6% mortgage with 20 years 
remaining, a curtailment payment of $5,000 under the CM will decrease the borrower’s 
mortgage payment from $966.45 to $930.63, a reduction of $35.82 each month for the 
next 20 years. With the $5,000 additional payment under the CM, he will still save 
$7,322 in interest charges, compared to the savings of $10,919 that would have been 
calculated under conventional terms. 
 
 
The Economic Benefits of the Curtailment Mortgage 
 
While the proposed CM represents a fairly simple change, there are substantial economic 
benefits to a CM borrower. From a macro-economic perspective, the biggest benefit from 
this payment reduction is that such a reduction represents a change in a homeowner’s 
permanent income. It’s widely known that real economic growth generally comes from 
increases in permanent income, and much less so from changes in transitory income. 
Permanent income increases can occur when an unemployed worker finds employment, a 
student gets his first job, or a worker receives a permanent raise. These changes in 
permanent income are what lead consumers to make long term purchase decisions that 
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often involve sizable durable goods such as cars. Long term income increases will allow 
them to sustain a loan payment to finance such purchases. In contrast, a one-time windfall 
gain which temporarily boosts an individual’s income has no wealth effect other than 
during the time they receive this gain.  
 
Since the longest debt most Americans will hold is their mortgage, a reduction in 
payments, even of a modest amount, will correspond roughly to receiving a raise at work, 
with its increase in disposable income. The raise effect becomes more prominent if we 
note that the reduction in payments represents an increase in after-tax income. By 
comparison, the equivalent increase in gross income that would be required to generate 
this increase in after-tax income is, of course, much more substantial.  
 
Using our previous example, if we assume the borrower qualifies for his loan under a 
23% qualification ratio (that is, his mortgage payment of $966.45 represents 23% of his 
gross monthly income), our borrower’s gross monthly income is $4,201.96. If we further 
assume that taxes and benefits account for 31% of his gross income, the borrower’s net 
monthly disposable income is $2,899.35. For this borrower, an increase in his net income 
of $35.82 under the CM would be equivalent to the borrower receiving a 1.2% pay raise 
in his gross income. A larger curtailment payment of $8,000 under the CM would reduce 
his monthly payment by $57.31 and would correspond to a 2% pay increase. We see that 
even with such seemingly modest reductions in mortgage payments, the equivalent 
increase in gross income to result in such reductions is not insignificant. 
 
Because of the long term nature of US mortgage debt, the CM’s adjustment in monthly 
payments can also be viewed as one of the few ways that consumers can effectively 
convert transitory income into permanent income. The low interest rate and lending 
friendly environment during the pre-subprime crisis period resulted in many households 
taking on additional mortgage debt in the form of second mortgages and cash-out 
refinancings. Some used these funds to finance discretionary purchases, such as vacations 
and various consumer goods. In essence, this environment encouraged consumers to 
purchase “transitory” goods using “permanent” income. The consequence of this 
sequence of events is that many homeowners ended up consuming their equity and 
therefore increasing their debt levels. This erosion in home equity also increases the 
likelihood of mortgage defaults, particularly in periods of falling house prices such as the 
one we recently experienced. The default rates in 2008 surely would have been lower had 
consumers not adopted such aggressive strategies. Given the long term nature of 
mortgages, the CM can potentially reverse this pattern by providing an incentive, and an 
effective financial vehicle, to convert the homeowner’s transitory income into permanent 
income. Not only is this income transfer an attractive feature, such transfers would also 
incentivize borrowers to increase their home equity.  
 
The ability to reduce one’s mortgage payment also can provide an incentive for 
homeowners to make further curtailment payments. For example, one can envision 
borrowers using tax refunds for curtailment payments each year, thereby effectively 
buying down their mortgage payments. Many occupations have defined periods when 
workers’ income increases, anticipated or unanticipated, in certain months of a year. 
4 
 
Assuming the base salary is sufficient for living expenses, such increases can be used as 
curtailment payments under the CM. This incentive will likely increase such activity and 
the consequence is that homeowners will accumulate home equity faster thus providing 
the entire housing sector better protection against mortgage defaults in the next downturn 
in house prices.  
 
It is important to note that curtailment payments under this CM proposal are strictly 
voluntary. If the borrower decides not to make such payments, then the mortgage behaves 
as a standard fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgage. Thus the borrower would be no worse 
off with a CM than if he took out such a conventional loan.  
 
 
If It Is So Good, Why Haven’t We Seen This Before? 
 
This question (why a mortgage that allows adjustable payments does not exist) can be 
partially addressed by looking into the mortgage securitization process. Mortgages are 
routinely packaged into bonds which are sold in the fixed-income bond markets. For 
bond investors prior to the crisis, the primary risk residential mortgaged-backed securities 
investors’ face is prepayment risk. Since conventional mortgage pools in the conforming 
loan market are guaranteed against default risk by the various government sponsored 
enterprises (GSE) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, investors are not concerned 
about mortgage defaults. What they are concerned with is the uncertainty associated with 
the premature prepayment of mortgages in the pools. A premature prepayment occurs 
when borrowers refinance, when they default (with the default guarantee provision paid 
by the GSEs), or when the borrowers make curtailment payments. Since the majority of 
mortgage prepayments occurs when homeowners refinance, the bond investors will 
prematurely receive their proceeds when interest rates have fallen, a time when they 
would least like to have their proceeds returned. Similarly, when rates rise, refinancing 
slows and bondholders are delayed from receiving their proceeds. Yet, this is often the 
time when they would like to see a faster prepayment so that they can take advantage of 
reinvesting their proceeds at the prevailing higher rates. Both effects represent 
prepayment risks, and the key component of investors’  analysis of these securities often 
involves complex models which attempt to predict prepayment under various interest rate 
scenarios. 
 
The CM will, of course, make predicting prepayment much more difficult since 
borrowers are allowed to partially refinance each month. Thus, a securitized pool of CM 
will have substantial prepayment risk, a feature that bond investors would find 
unattractive. This unattractive feature will likely discourage investors from investing in 
such an asset and therefore deter the creation of a secondary market for such loans. Then 
again, models could be developed to predict when homeowners will receive small 
curtailment sums for each borrower for each pool. 
 
While it is possible that the added prepayment risks posed by the CM’s prepayment will 
likely result in higher mortgage rates for such loans, this feature is somewhat offset by 
the fact that the default rates of such loans will likely be lower. With curtailment, the 
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homeowner will likely lead to an accelerated increase his equity position over time thus 
making such loans less likely to default.  
 
 
Is This the Right Time? 
 
With the current reevaluation of the GSEs, this may present a fruitful time to implement 
the curtailment mortgage. With the GSE essentially becoming part of the government, 
these entities can be asked to insure such loans for the social benefit they produce at the 
expense of GSE’s profits. Then again, since the default risks are lower for CM, a GSE 
guarantee may be financially viable. In sum, the benefits of CMs should far outweigh 
their disadvantages, and, more critically, the curtailment mortgage could be an engine for 
accelerating the recovery of the US housing market. 
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